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THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
We make war so that we may live in peace.
Aristotle
In response to an international order of growing terrorism, trans-national crime, "rogue"
and "failed" states potentially armed with WMD and will to use them, the National Security
Strategy has invoked an escalation of the right of self-defense as it prosecutes the Global War on Terrorism. Termed preemption, it is in fact a policy of preventive self-defense.
The National Security Strategy policy of preventive self-defense has been generally condemned throughout the international arena and also within the U.S. However, this condemnation is not universal. This study will show that a significant amount of validity can be conferred on the National Security Strategy due to: (1) the failure of the UN enforce its charter, essentially abandoning the purposes of the UN (2) the continued use and threat of use of preventive self-defense by many states and previous U.S. administrations (3) state practice (4) customary international law (5) the slowly changing body of international law that is responding to and inferring more significance due to the rise of transnational terrorists and WMD proliferation over state sovereignty.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
In the Overview of The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, President George W. Bush put forth a number of idealistic aspirations. These aspirations were not just for the United States of America, but also for the entire world. For example:
"champion aspirations for human dignity;"
"strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism to prevent attacks against us and our friends;" "work with others to defuse regional conflicts;"
"ignite an era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade"
"expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;" 1 Each of these areas was thoroughly expanded and developed within the National Security Strategy and they made up a significant portion of the document. While quite laudable, areas such as these generated a muted level of interest and discussion. The overwhelming attention of both the United States and the international community focused almost singularly on another significant tenet espoused throughout the document.
"Identifying and destroying the threat before it reaches our borders . . . . we will not hesitate to act alone if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists." 2 "The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction---and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. From these definitions, one can discern an obvious hierarchy based on the level of imminence the threat presents.
1. Anticipatory self-defense associated with an "instantaneous" or truly, imminent threat.
2. Preemptive attack associated with "incontrovertible evidence that an enemy attack is imminent."
3. Preventive war associated with an " inevitable" future threat, but not linked in any way with the concept of an imminent threat.
One can form an association between anticipatory self-defense and preemptive attack based on their respective references to a requirement for some level of an imminent threat.
Based on this requirement of imminence, the distinction between anticipatory self-defense and preemptive attack has become blurred and these terms are often used interchangeably.
However, the lack of any reference to an imminent threat in the definition of preventive war would clearly distinguish it from anticipatory self-defense and preemptive attack.
Interestingly, a review of the use of the words anticipatory and preemptive in the National Security Strategy reveals an obvious disconnect with the Department of Defense and United
States Army, Judge Advocate General definitions. In most cases "preventive" can be substituted for anticipatory and preemption within the National Security Strategy and the document is transformed to agree with these definitions.
For the purposes of this paper, it will be stipulated that when the National Security Strategy of the United States uses the words anticipatory and preemption in the context of the nation's self-defense, it is in fact referring to concepts that are more commonly accepted as preventive self-defense. 8 While the legality of initiating the use of force in self-defense remains an area of much debate within the United Nations and international law, one can clearly delineate a significant difference in this arena when comparing the use of anticipatory/preemptive to preventive. In fact, it is quite evident that most of the world (including much of the United States) would support the argument that the use of preventive in the context of self-defense is not a matter of self-defense at all. The vast majority of legal debate, argument, and opinion declares that the concept of preventive self-defense is illegal under international law and the Charter of the United Nations.
One might easily dismiss the validity of the National Security Strategy based on the above conclusion. However, international law and the United Nations have been and remain a dynamic entity. Taking a stance in this arena is an open invitation for a debate. Perhaps there is a future for the National Security Strategy.
USE OF FORCE IN SELF-DEFENSE UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS
A nation and its right of self-defense is a controversial and active part of the international legal debate, even more than 50 years since most of the world's nations became signatories of the charter of the United Nations. Why? Because the world has suffered many conflicts in the past 50 plus years and self-defense is claimed as a factor in most of them. Self-defense of a nation remains the most common legal justification under international law and the United Nations for the use of coercive force between states. 9 Under the charter of the United Nations, the generally accepted sections applicable to the use of force in self-defense are:
Chapter One, Article 2 (Principles), Paragraph 4:
"All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
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Chapter 7 (actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of peace, and acts of aggression), Article Fifty-One:
"Nothing in the Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
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These two articles appear fairly straightforward. They could be boiled down to no use of force except in self-defense after an attack and then only until the Security Council takes necessary measures to "restore international peace and security." There exists a substantial amount of legal opinion in the arena of international law that supports this simple, somewhat literal, interpretation of these articles. Any use of force outside of this interpretation would be considered a violation of international law and the charter of the United Nations. Is it really this simple?
At least in practice, no. Columbia University international security policy expert Richard K.
Betts wrote, "I am aware of no case in which international law has blocked a decision to wage war -that is, a case in which a government decided that strategic necessity required war yet refrained because international law was deemed to forbid it." He further notes that once the decision is made by a state to go to war, "they find a lawyer to tell the world that international law allows it."
12

RESTRICTIONISTS VS. COUNTER-RESTRICTIONISTS
The debate on the self-defense of a nation under Articles 2 (4) and 51 has developed along 2 schools of thought, the Restrictionists and the Counter-Restrictionists. Restrictionist school of thought to such an extreme that should the Security Council decline to take action, the victim is no longer authorized to even defend itself by force. 18 Additionally, the
Restrictionists assert that in the case of a humanitarian intervention to prevent genocide or to accomplish a hostage rescue, the use of force must be authorized by the Security Council. 19 Unfortunately, the Security Council will often go to extraordinary lengths to keep from interfering with the sovereignty of a state and fail to intervene in cases such as genocide. Recent examples include Rwanda and Kosovo. Such a position would appear to be in direct contravention to the purposes of the UN under Article 1 ("prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace;"
"solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character") 20 The logic of the Restrictionist position is predicated on a desire to avoid the use of armed force, if at all possible. Requiring an "armed attack" to resort to force outside of the authority of the Security Council minimizes ambiguity, making unacceptable uses of force clear to all the world's nations. 21 In practice, the Restrictionist school of thought has proven to be quite idealistic. The United Nations has a poor record of preventing " the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." The analysis reveals that there were significant differences among the Great Powers.
They all brought their own concerns that didn't always coincide with the other's concerns. This is reflected in Kearly's conclusion that "there were substantial, unresolved disagreements . . . This conclusion confirms that considerable ambiguity is built into the charter. The ambiguity was acceptable to the framers because they wanted an agreement; without the ambiguity, it is likely there would be no agreement due to the differing concerns and motives of This indicates that the framers intended the law applying organ, i.e. the Security Council to make decisions case by case in good faith as the need arose in ambiguous situations.
Conversely, it does not appear the framers intended international jurists to interpret the charter and establish new legal principles.
The following conclusions were made by Kearly:
1. Preventive self-defense was to be eliminated except as authorized by the Security
Council under Chapter 7 and as provided for under Article 107 concerning former enemy states.
2. Article 2 (4) was intended to be a broad renunciation of the use of force in international relations.
Force could be used if the Security Council were to fail in dealing with the dispute or if
it were to become deadlocked.
4. Anticipatory self-defense as provided for under customary international law was not changed other than it should only be utilized if it was consistent with the purposes of the UN.
Preemptive self-defense was not addressed and therefore is not prohibited as long as
its use is consistent with the purposes of the UN.
6. Success of the UN depended on mutual good faith among the members of the Security Council in pursing the goals of the UN.
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PREVENTIVE SELF-DEFENSE
Critics of the National Security Strategy typically renounce the U.S. as embarking on unilateral, hegemonic mission to overturn the guarantee of international peace secured in 1945
by the UN Charter. They cry that the concept of preventive self-defense was eliminated for good on that day. Noam Chomsky, a prominent MIT professor and political dissident recently wrote, "Preventive war is, very simply, the 'supreme crime' condemned at Nuremburg." 35 A rather harsh condemnation considering that the concept of preventive self-defense is part of the UN Charter. Critics of the National Security Strategy such as Chomsky typically ignore or summarily dismiss the fact that in 1945, the UN Charter actually contained a provision authorizing the very crime they denounce so vehemently, preventive self-defense.
Chapter 17 (Transitional Security Arrangements), Article 107:
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.
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Article 107 was created due to the desires of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France.
They had suffered greatly in the two World Wars at the hands of aggressive powers that did not respond to peaceful efforts to resolve matters. Kearly in his previously mentioned review that it would be impossible to limit the use of Article 107 precisely due to the very ambiguity of this phrase. 38 An additional conclusion from Kearly's review, the framers "assumed the permanent members of the Security Council would negotiate judgments concerning uses of force case by case in good faith." The framers understood the concerns of the European allies and they supported this article based on good faith. Although Article 107 does not apply today, it has to be recognized that preventive self-defense is not a new concept to the UN and its members.
Preventive self-defense as expressed in the National Security Strategy could be fairly evaluated on a case-by-case basis within the Security Council to determine if it is in concert with the purposes of the UN. Just as it was when Article 107 was created. For the UN and international community to laconically declare that any use of preventive self-defense is a violation of the UN Charter simply ensures they won't be consulted and opens the door to the National Security Strategy option of unilateral action.
Interestingly, it would be a mistake to believe the U.S. is the sole keeper of the preventive self-defense flame. In September 2003, the French Ministry of Defense stated, "Outside our borders, within the framework of prevention and projection-action, we must be able to identify and prevent threats as soon as possible. Within this framework, possible preemptive action is not out of the question, where an explicit and confirmed threat has been recognized." The National Security Strategy is making the same argument today. However, the environment is even more dangerous as the real fear is the "One too small" (terrorists) could come to posses and use the "weapons of near-paralyzing destructiveness." Article 2 (4) and Article 51 simply aren't designed to address this threat and the Security Council has refused to consider it.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Customary international law is not necessarily what is written down, but what states
actually practice. 47 Accepting that preventive self-defense is illegal under the UN Charter, use of preventive self-defense as proposed under the National Security Strategy would be considered illegal. However, if preventive self-defense reflects customary international law, it could be considered lawful. Center for International Affairs, conducted an extensive study on the response of international law to conflict over time. Law is not static; it is dynamic, responding and adjusting to the community on whose behalf it operates. It does not respond on a case-by-case basis, but moves in a general direction which can be predictive of its future. 51 Professor Schmitt offers a compelling analysis that indicates the international community may already be moving in a direction that will accommodate the National Security Strategy under international law.
In 1986, the U.S. launched Operation El Dorado Canyon, attacking terrorist facilities in Libya in response to the bombing of a Berlin discotheque by a group supported by Libya. Selfdefense under Article 51 was the justification offered by the U.S. The attack was overwhelmingly condemned. The General Assembly passed a resolution "deploring" the action and the only support for the U.S. was from Great Britain and Israel. 52 In 1998, after bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the U.S. launched cruise missiles against a pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum that was allegedly producing chemical weapons that could fall into terrorist's hands. Again, self-defense under Article 51 was the justification. In this case there was significant support for the U. S. and there was no clear consensus that the violation of Sudan's sovereignty was illegal. Most significantly, the criticism was not focused on the fact that the U.S. had launched the attack, the concern focused on whether the target was actually involved in terrorism. The issue at hand was whether the U.S.
possessed sufficient evidence to attack the pharmaceutical plant, not the legal authority to attack. This illustrates a change in the community attitude towards use of force against terrorist targets.
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One can detect a similar response to the actions of the U.S. in Iraq. Before the initiation of hostilities, there was significant discussion and maneuvering on the legality of the U.S. action against Iraq. However, the current discussion and condemnation for the most part centers on the fact that no WMD has been found. Again, not whether the U.S. had the legal authority to act against the Iraqi regime, but that there was insufficient evidence.
Professor Schmitt proposes a legal basis for the violation of the territorial integrity in the pursuit of terrorists, citing the well known Caroline case as the precedent. Canadian rebels were operating from the U.S. and despite British demands, the U. On the subject of preemption, he states that the condemnation of such a policy is based on the fact that terrorist attacks are mischaracterized as isolated incidents. Considering alQa'ida for example, which has been involved in a terror campaign since 1993. "Once a terrorist campaign is launched, the issue of preemption becomes moot because an operation already underway cannot, by definition, be preempted." 56 Nor would a response be considered preventive in nature.
Schmitt's conclusion, "There is little doubt that events of the last five years are signaling a sea of change in jus ad bellum . Slowly but surely this body of law is becoming more permissive in response to the demise of nuclear armed bipolar competition and the rise of both transnational terrorists and WMD proliferation."
CONCLUSION
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation.
Oliver Wendell Holmes
Since the formation of the UN, there have been nearly 300 interstate conflicts resulting in the deaths of 22 million people. The hope of the joint declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill "that all nations of the world must come to the abandonment of the use of force" has never materialized.
Success of the UN depended on a Security Council that that makes decisions on a caseby-case basis in good faith and enforces them. The UN never matured into the enforcement organization the framers intended and that was required for its success. It is essentially a political organization and as Secretary of State Colin Powell warned, it is close to becoming "a feckless debating society."
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There is no doubt that this is a path fraught with peril. The Global War on Terrorism will go on for decades. Any use of preventive self-defense must retain the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. It should be a tool of last resort utilized only after careful consideration combined with efforts exercising all elements of national power. However, it is a tool that will be required as the U.S engages and defeats its enemies in the Global war on Terrorism.
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